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ABSTRACT 
Environmental policy has become increasingly important as states attempt to curb 
negative environmental impacts and adopt a more a sustainable economic approach that relies on 
alternative energies instead of fossil fuels. Many countries have adopted policies to foster the 
production of renewable energy, chief among them feed-in tariffs (FiT) and renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS). Extensive study as to the pros and cons of both of these approaches has been 
done using a multitude of methodologies, but little research exists that examines why states 
choose one approach over the other. This paper seeks to address this gap in the existing research 
by exploring the following question: why have some European states adopted FiT legislation and 
others not? I test the primary model for state policy adoption – the integrated diffusion of 
innovation (DOI) model – in order to determine the extent to which this theoretical approach 
applies in an EU context. I use event history analysis to examine FiT legislation adoption in 
order to identify patterns and traits of those most likely to employ FiT. Using existing DOI 
literature as a guide, I test several internal determinants – problem severity, energy dependency, 
wealth, ideology, and interest group pressure – as well as spatial diffusion to understand the 
determinants of FiT legislation adoption. My results suggest that regional effects strongly 
influence FiT diffusion in Europe, while internal determinants are less likely to predict 
policymaking. To conclude, I offer suggestions for future research in this area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The political importance of renewable energy (RE) policy has risen dramatically over the 
last few decades. As the threat of global warming brought on by greenhouse gas emissions 
looms, many countries, particularly those in Europe, have encouraged the domestic production of 
renewable energies such as wind, solar, hydro, and biomass power (Hill, 2010). Most of these 
policies can be broadly categorized into one of two forms: feed-in tariffs – price supports for RE 
that are particularly prevalent in Europe – and renewable portfolio standards – RE quotas for 
utility companies that are more common in the United States. While extensive study of the 
consequences of these policy alternatives exists (Danchev, Maniatis, and Tsakanikas, 2009; 
Williges, Lilliestam, and Patt, 2010; del Río, 2010; Butler and Neuhoff, 2007; Toke, 2006; 
Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; Campoccia et. al., 2008; Traber and Kemfert, 2009), little analysis 
regarding the motivations of states in choosing one policy over the other has been undertaken. 
Some quantitative analyses of environmental policy adoption within the US using DOI theory 
exist (Chandler, 2009; Matisoff, 2008; Daley, 2007), but comparable evaluation of feed-in tariff 
adoption in Europe has yet to be explored. Research into this field is a logical next step; does the 
integrated DOI model explain the proliferation of feed-in tariff legislation in Europe? 
Most of the current legislative action to promote RE production and limit the release of 
greenhouse gases has been done at the national level or lower. Although the Kyoto protocol 
established a large global consensus regarding a desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 
lack of US participation in the treaty limited its effectiveness. More recently, US and Chinese 
opposition to a new, international RE framework at the summit in Copenhagen in 2010 further 
stifled environmentalists‘ aspirations to create transnational cooperation in this legislative area. 
Due to this lack of supranational teamwork, individual states are left to create and tinker with 
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their own unique policy ideas. As a result, states have considered and adopted a variety of 
policies to address climate change and fossil fuel dependence. Many European states have 
chosen to adopt FiT legislation. Most states in the US, however, have decided to adopt RPS 
policies. Some countries in the world, such as China, opt for no formal policy approach. In any 
case, much of the European continent has selected a relatively similar policy course, while the 
US and other countries of the world try other approaches or do nothing. This paper seeks to 
explain why European countries have been nearly unanimous in their acceptance of FiT 
legislation.  
As this paper explores the state motivation of policy adoption, it also provides insight 
into an adjacent area of study.  A variety of research on management of common pool resources 
contend that population increases deleteriously affect common resource management (Ehrlich, 
1968; Malthus, 1960) and that smaller groups are better able to manage shared resources than 
larger counterparts (Olson, 1965). Others dispute a directly linear relationship between 
population and environmental stewardship (Leach and Mearns, 1996), but a large consensus in 
the literature supports the claim that commonly shared resources are neglected in terms of 
sustainable management (Hardin, 1968). This paper helps to explain why states choose to adopt 
policies regarding the management of a common pool resource. Contrary to what previous 
researchers have asserted, the salience of the environmental objectives of increasing RE 
production and improving sustainability have increased along with the population. FiT 
legislation represents a new way of better managing the common resources of air quality, sea 
level, and species protection. In the absence of a binding supranational framework, 
understanding why the states of Europe voluntarily adopt a legislative policy that will spread 
environmental benefits to non-participating countries while its economic and associated costs 
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will be borne almost exclusively domestically is important. Many of the benefits of adopting FiT 
legislation are diffuse - the air, land, and water is cleaner for all states, not just those who adopt 
the legislation - but the costs are concentrated - only enacting states pay the price supports to 
help foster RE. Prevailing opinion holds that this should not happen, but clearly something 
causes EU states to adopt this policy goal. Research into this decision therefore provides some 
understanding as to how and why common pool resources may be better managed.  
To test DOI theory, I utilize event history analysis to examine the relative impact of 
important demographic, ideological, and economic factors influencing policy adoption in 
European countries over time. This data are drawn from EUROSTAT, an EU agency that is 
tasked with compiling information on EU member states, the European Election Database, a 
compilation of election results for EU members over time, and the European Green Party website 
which contains detailed information about that interest group and its electoral history. The 
outcome of the my analysis represents a somewhat surprising departure from most of the 
literature in that I do not find that internal factors play an especially strong role in a state‘s 
decision to adopt FiT legislation. Instead, regional diffusion is a consistent predictor of policy 
adoption. 
In the next section, I review the current literature on DOI theory as well as the topic of 
FiT. I use this information to formulate hypotheses as to what indicators should be tested in my 
analysis, and I articulate the hypotheses at the end of the literature review section. In the methods 
section, I explain how I operationalize the indicators I have selected as well as the data sets 
available. Next, I explain the results of the event history analysis and provide a table of results 
for the three models I test. Finally, I offer concluding remarks about the results of my analysis as 
well as suggestions for future research.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Internal Determinants and Regional Diffusion Literature 
Diffusion of innovation theory seeks to explain why states choose to adopt policies. 
According to this theory, there are two primary motivations that predict government action, 
internal determinants and regional diffusion (Walker, 1969; Berry and Berry, 1999). Internal 
determinants include characteristics within a state, such as its citizens‘ ideology, governmental 
structure, economic situation, natural resources, etc., that influence its decision to act politically. 
Extensive research using diffusion of innovation theory has been done, and a variety of 
important internal determinants have already been identified. These include, but are not limited 
to, interest group pressure and speed of government action (Daley, 2007), citizen demands 
(Matisoff, 2008), socioeconomic level and predominant governing ideology (Chandler, 2009), 
the election cycle and economic crisis (Berry and Berry, 1992), and the social stratification of the 
populace coupled with a state‘s fiscal outlook (Filer, Moak, and Uze, 1988). This is not an 
exhaustive review of all DOI research that has identified important internal indicators, but it is 
reflective of typical findings when internal determinants are especially salient. These factors are 
not always found to be particularly predictive. Instead, the existing research provides a guide of 
certain traits that are useful to understanding state action for certain policies.  In this regard, DOI 
research undertaken that relates to environmental policy adoption is especially useful and shows 
that factors such as interest group pressure, citizen demands, as well as state affluence and 
ideology, should be included in this analysis (Daley, 2007; Matisoff, 2008; Chandler, 2009).  
Regional diffusion of policies is the other main explanatory factor in DOI theory. 
Regional diffusion explains a state‘s decision to adopt a policy by examining the presence of the 
policy or something similar in a neighboring state or nearby region. In some circumstances, 
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states may enact legislation not because of their internal traits, but out of competition or 
emulation of their neighbors. Numerous studies demonstrate the importance of regional factors 
in explaining a state‘s decision to adopt a particular policy. These include, but are not limited to, 
renewable energy legislation (Chandler, 2009), tax policy (Berry and Berry, 1990), and terrorism 
responses (Chamberlain and Haider-Markel, 2005). The diffusion of a policy can occur in a 
direct fashion in which the legislation spills over to adjacent neighbors or spreads through a 
particularly distinct region. The aforementioned studies provide an example of this type of 
diffusion. Other analyses of DOI theory and its spread identify an additional important type of 
diffusion known as hierarchical or leader-laggard diffusion. Hierarchical diffusion occurs when a 
policy diffuses from a particularly powerful hegemon down to less influential states. This related 
but distinct form of diffusion has empirical support in studies of policy spread within the United 
States (Walker, 1969; Freeman, 1985) and internationally (Collier and Messick, 1975). 
Regardless of the particular type of diffusion, the broad theoretical underpinning of the 
motivation for policy spread remains the same. States take legislative action due to interaction 
with, and experimentation of, external actors. They learn from their neighbors and, in some 
cases, compete with them as a result of policy decisions. These activities influence states to act, 
even if certain domestic stimuli are absent. 
Extensive research of DOI theory has found explanatory factors that are not easily 
categorized into the internal determinants or regional diffusion classifications. Studies show that 
interstate professional associations (Balla, 2001), policy entrepreneurs (Grinstein-Weiss et. al., 
2009; Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom and Vergari, 1998), federal incentives or other vertical 
governmental forces (Savage, 1985; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Welch and Thompson, 1980), the 
nature of the policy (Savage, 1984; Canon and Baum 1981; Mooney and Lee, 1995), and cultural 
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effects on institutions (Strang and Meyer, 1993) all influence a policy‘s spread. These studies 
represent an important contribution to DOI theory and understanding policy diffusion. As a first 
attempt to apply DOI theory to an EU context, I focus on the direct internal determinants and 
established understandings of regional diffusion.  
Statistical analysis of data sets has evolved greatly since the first forays into DOI research 
were done. Early study of policy diffusion did not include event history analysis (Walker, 1969). 
For this reason, other researchers were critical of the utility of DOI theory, primarily for its 
inability to accurately gauge the importance of regional effects in policy spread (Gray, 1973). 
Statistical analysis has improved significantly over time, allowing more accurate testing of the 
theory (Berry and Berry, 1999). The current model utilizes event history analysis in order to test 
the relative importance of regional effects and internal determinants on policy adoption.  
DOI theory has been tested in a variety of substantive areas, including: lottery adoption 
(Berry and Berry, 1990; Filer, Moak, and Uze, 1988), tax policy (Berry and Berry, 1992), 
electricity deregulation (Andrews, 2000), terrorism responses (Chamberlain and Haider-Markel, 
2005), and educational reforms (Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; Renzulli and Roscigno, 2005). 
International literature using DOI theory exists, but it has been more limited in its application 
and scope. International DOI research focuses largely on the diffusion of much larger topics such 
as neoliberal economic policies (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, 
2006; Levi-Faur, 2005) and democracy (Wejnert, 2005). Very limited research of the 
international dynamic and its influence on policy diffusion exists (Meyer et. al., 1997; True and 
Mintrom, 2001), and it does not analyze a specific policy‘s spread across sovereign states. The 
subject of this paper fills an important void in the current literature by analyzing DOI through 
both the uniquely federal EU structure and across countries. Whereas previous research is limited 
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largely to application within the United States or has been applied very broadly in an 
international context, the research in this paper transcends these barriers. I test an established 
theory in a new setting to determine its explanatory power in a comparative nation-state setting. 
By doing so, understanding of DOI theory expands and new avenues for critique and 
improvement of the theory open up.  
Feed-in Tariff and Renewable Portfolio Standards Literature 
Feed-in tariffs guarantee all renewable electricity generators access to the utility grid and 
require utility companies to purchase electricity from these producers at mandated rates that are 
set above market value and vary based upon the method – hydro, solar, wind, etc. - by which the 
electricity is generated. The differences in payouts are designed to account for variations in 
prices of production; the goal is to ensure that all generators of renewable energy can expect a 
modest profit for the energy that they produce, regardless of method used. The utility company 
then usually increases rates to all electricity consumers in order to pay for the more expensive 
renewable energy that is being fed into the system. These price supports for renewable energy 
producers are guaranteed by the government for a specific period of time – from as little as eight 
years to as many as twenty – to provide confidence for potential energy generators to make the 
investments necessary – such as purchasing photovoltaic cells for solar energy production or 
turbines for wind energy – to produce. Most feed-in tariff payouts also diminish over time. This 
serves as a dual incentive for investors to begin producing renewable electricity sooner and to 
encourage electricity generation to become cost-effective and not remain payout dependent in 
perpetuity.   
By comparison, renewable portfolio standards – more widely used in the US - are 
government requirements on utility companies to either generate or purchase a certain percentage 
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of their energy from renewable sources. Utilities are forced to buy certificates that correspond to 
an amount of energy produced and must accumulate enough certificates to meet the government 
mandated quota, which is proportional to the amount of overall energy that they transmit. 
Certificates are tradable among utilities in order to not overly penalize or reward companies that 
have certain geographic or infrastructural disadvantages or advantages in terms of renewable 
energy acquisition. Transfer of certificates also creates a self-regulating market for their use. 
Utilities that do not obtain enough certificates pay penalties that are recycled to companies that 
do meet their renewable energy quota, thereby increasing the incentive for compliance. 
Most academic research into FiT and RPS legislation is evaluative and focuses on the 
outputs of the policies in the implementing countries. This body of literature examines aspects 
such as the internal rate of return on photovoltaic investments under FiT legislation in Greece 
(Danchev, Maniatis, and Tsakanikas, 2009); cost competitiveness of RE under FiT as compared 
to non-renewable sources (Williges, Lilliestam, and Patt, 2010); energy efficiency improvements 
under RE promotion regimes (del Río, 2010); the pay-back period, net present value, and internal 
rate of return for different PV and wind systems (Campoccia et. al., 2008); changes in 
deployment and costs (Butler and Neuhoff, 2007; Toke, 2006; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008); 
and changes in consumer costs versus producer costs (Traber and Kemfert, 2009). Additionally, 
a significant portion of the evaluative research shows that specific policy design has a profound 
impact on the achievements of RE promotion legislation (Ringel, 2005; Ohl and Eichhorn, 2009; 
del Río and Gual, 2004; Lipp, 2007); coordinating RE objectives between state and federal 
governments significantly influences the ability to meet policy objectives, as does the specific 
setting of the price support and its duration. Altogether, this body of literature contributes greatly 
to our understanding of policy implementation and impact. The variety of methods used to 
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evaluate the legislation as well as the diversity of the impacts that are analyzed provide 
invaluable information on FiT and RPS policies. The utility of these analyses are limited, 
however, in that they do not substantively examine why states choose to adopt the RE policies 
that they do or why they implement any RE legislation at all.  
Research into the motivations for FiT and RPS adoption has been undertaken, but it is 
much more limited in number than the evaluative research. Case studies into Texas‘s decision to 
adopt RPS (Hurlbut, 2008) and Germany‘s choice to employ FiT (Lauber and Mez, 2006) are 
particularly informative, but the nature of the case study prohibits widespread application to 
other implementing states. Non state-specific study into the spread of FiT policies in Europe 
exists (Söderholm and Klaassen, 2006; Eikeland and Sæverud, 2007), but it has a few 
weaknesses. Söderholm and Klaassen only examine the diffusion of wind power legislation – 
which is only one of many sectors affected by FiT and RPS designs – and both studies fail to 
examine regional effects. Although they provide valuable insight, they are not informed by 
theory and they neglect important external factors that might influence a state‘s decision to adopt 
a policy. 
Other studies provide overviews of various government policy designs to foster RE 
generation (Ackermann, Andersson, and Söder, 1997), examine potential US benefits of 
implementing adopting FiT (Michel, 2007), discuss harmonization of RE policies in Europe and 
with the EU‘s goal of liberalizing electricity markets (Meyer, 2003; Verbruggen and Lauber, 
2009), and the constitutionality of FiT policies in the US (Perkins, 2009; Ferrey, Laurent, and 
Ferrey 2010). This research is an important corollary to the studies mentioned above, as these 
analyses examine the long-term political sustainability of RE generation legislation. The 
European Commission is intent on creating a European single market for economic exchange, 
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and its goal is to incorporate energy production in this broader framework. Currently, most 
energy production remains nationalized, and only a small percentage of energy is sold across 
borders. Contentious political debate often surrounds FiT legislation, as opponents claim that it is 
anathema to markets or fair, inter-state competition. Additionally, as FiT legislation has diffused 
throughout Europe, it has gained popularity in other regions of the globe, including the US. As 
states increasingly turn to this method of fostering RE production, scrutiny of impacts and its 
compliance with the Constitution will likely increase (Perkins, 2009; Ferrey, Laurent, and Ferrey 
2010). These studies are particularly helpful in examining the potential future of FiT and RPS 
legislation, but they are limited, because they do not examine the important past regarding states‘ 
decisions to enact FiT or RPS legislation. My research is an attempt to address this incomplete 
part of the literature.  
Hypotheses 
 The current literature on DOI theory and the topic of RE legislation suggest several 
hypotheses as to what indicators are likely to influence a state‘s decision to implement FiT 
legislation. 
 Internal Determinants: 
(1) States are likely to be responsive to problem conditions. States that rank poorly on 
indicators such as air quality, water quality, and environmentally induced health 
difficulties are more likely to encourage renewable sources of energy.  
(2) States that are dependent on fuel sources from foreign countries are more likely to 
support RE generation initiatives. Many states consider energy dependence as a threat 
to national security, so threatened states should have a greater impetus to enact 
legislation to limit this threat. 
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a. States that have a strong fossil fuel sector are less likely to adopt RE 
legislation. In democratic states, interest groups are allowed to lobby and try 
to influence elected leaders. In states where non-renewable interests are 
financially and politically connected, the government will not likely 
implement a RE promoting initiative. 
(3) States in which citizens are more ideologically liberal are more likely to support FiT 
legislation. FiT policies are perceived as being more command-and-control in nature 
than their RPS counterparts. States that have citizens who are more likely to embrace 
strong federal dicta regarding policy initiatives related to achieving environmentally 
friendly objectives will be more receptive of the FiT approach.  
a. More conservative states are less likely to adopt FiT policies and instead will 
embrace a RPS approach or no RE promotion scheme at all. RPS policies are 
perceived as being friendlier to free-markets than FiT legislation. States that 
emphasize small government or minimal government interplay with the 
economy are therefore less likely to support FiT. 
(4) States that have an influential Green party are more likely to adopt RE legislation. RE 
initiatives in many European states were introduced by Green parties. These groups 
advocate environmental consciousness and sustainability, so states with a large Green 
presence will embrace FiT. 
(5) Wealthier states are more likely to enact FiT legislation. FiT ensure cash payouts to 
RE generators and can lead to electricity price increases. States with populations who 
are better off financially are more likely to support this policy design than states with 
poorer populaces. 
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Regional Diffusion:  
(1) States are more likely to adopt FiT legislation if neighboring states also do so. States 
are cognizant of the actions of their neighbors, and in an effort to remain competitive 
with those countries, they will often mimic policy initiatives that they believe are 
beneficial. 
METHODS 
 I use event history analysis to identify which variables have a particularly salient 
predictive value in states‘ decisions to adopt FiT legislation. This approach is well-grounded in 
DOI and international relations literature (Bennett and Stam, 1996; Berry and Berry, 1999; Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). In event history analysis the dependent variable is coded 
dichotomously and drops out after a state adopts FiT legislation. This allows analysis of data 
leading up to the point of adoption, while dropping out data post-adoption. Motivation for state 
action is better evaluated through this method. I chose event history analysis instead of a simple 
logistic regression, because I could not find any instance of a state adopting FiT and later 
abandoning it. I obtain the data used in this analysis from EUROSTAT, a statistical collection 
agency affiliated with the European Commission, the European Election Database, and the 
European Green Party website. The data available for each variable are not uniform; some data 
sets date from 1990 to the present, while others are for shorter time frames. The overall temporal 
scale for the analysis is 1990 to the present. Table 1 offers a brief synopsis of each measure and a 
description of its calculation.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Problem Severity 
 I use emissions of acidifying substances as a measure of a state‘s environmental health. 
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This data set dates from 1990-2006. It is also available on a sector-by-sector basis (energy, 
manufacturing, transport, etc.), but I use the aggregate measure in my analysis, because the 
aggregate better quantifies the problem threat. The specific source sector is irrelevant in 
evaluating the health effects on the populace; more important is the overall health threat. These 
acidifying substances have deleterious health effects (WHO, 2011), and the presence of these 
pollutants should therefore give states reason to promote RE. 
Energy Dependency 
 For this model, I collect information on each country‘s energy dependency on coal, oil, 
and natural gas. The data date from 1998-2008. This measure calculates the amount of imported 
energy an economy needs to continue to function. A more perfect measure would incorporate 
rhetoric or public sentiment toward each imported energy source. For example, natural gas from 
Russia and oil from the Middle East are often cited as problems in terms of EU member state 
safety. An aggregate measure of the amount of these imported energy sources is not perfect, but 
it does represent an important baseline in understanding security threats tied to energy sources. 
Ideology 
 In order to measure citizens‘ political ideology, I use election results from each of the 
member states. I input the total vote percentage vote won by the social democratic parties of each 
state. I gather this data from the European Election Database, and, in order to be consistent, I use 
the categorization offered by the website. Any party identified as ―social democrat‖ or 
―democratic socialist‖ was included in my study. Some states have multiple social democratic 
parties, while others have none. For states that had multiple social democratic parties in power 
simultaneously, I add the total percentage votes for each of the parties together to form a single 
measure. All other parties were excluded from my analysis. I assume that states that have higher 
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vote totals for social democratic parties are more liberal.  
Interest Group Pressure 
 In this model, I analyze Green party election results in EU member countries over time. 
The Green party is dedicated to promoting environmentally sustainable economic initiatives and 
encourages environmental protection. The data I use is obtained from the European Green party 
website. Data is not uniformly available for all EU member countries, as elections are held in 
varying cycles and the Green party has not existed in all EU states for the same duration of time. 
I use the total percent of the vote won by the Green party. 
Wealth 
 For this model, I use real GDP per capita and net national income. The data set for GDP 
ranges from 1995-2010 and for net national income it is from 1990-2009. GDP measures goods, 
services, and products that are produced by general government and non-profit institutions 
within each member state. This number is then divided by member state population. Net national 
income measures all state income minus income earned from external actors and payments made 
to external actors. Taken together, these two measures provide an accurate snapshot of a state‘s 
socioeconomic level and thereby identify wealthier countries more likely to adopt FiT 
legislation. 
Diffusion 
 In order to test diffusion effects, I code EU member states ―0‖ or ―1‖ over the 20 year 
period for which I have data. Member states are coded as ―0‖ for years that they have not 
adopted FiT legislation or ―1‖ for years in which they have adopted FiT. I obtain dates for each 
country‘s adoption from the Institute for Building Efficiency, a research group that promotes 
eco-friendly business solutions. To create a diffusion measure, I count the number of states that 
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have adopted FiT as of that year. I then subtract the state of analysis; this is represented by 1. 
Finally, I divide that number by the number of other member states of the EU, 26, yielding the 
value used for diffusion for that country. This results in a variable that measures average 
diffusion pressure over time. The formula is provided below, and Appendix 1 provides the date 
of adoption for each EU country. 
f=(x-1)/26 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis. The results 
of the event history analyses can be found in Tables 3-5. Contrary to many studies in DOI 
literature, in all of my models internal determinants were not statistically significant predictors of 
state adoption of FiT. Diffusion effects, conversely, were significant in all models. 
[Insert Tables 2-5 here] 
Surprisingly, none of the internal determinants proved particularly salient in the models. 
This runs contrary to much of the research done using DOI theory and is largely counterintuitive. 
States with poor air quality are as likely to promote RE as states with clean air. Energy 
independent states adopt FiT just like their energy dependent counterparts. Ideology, interest 
group pressure, and state wealth are similarly no more or less likely to adopt FiT. Two things 
explain these results. First, the data sets for the variables I selected may not provide a sufficient 
time frame to analyze this diffusion process. Ideally, the data available would be for a time frame 
longer than 20 years. Second, European states may be much more similar than the states in the 
US. The very close proximity of the member states and their populations, coupled with EU 
directives to harmonize living conditions in the Union may make study of policy diffusion 
incompatible with current methodology. Obviously there are very real, observable differences in 
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many of the measures I use in this study, but the overall range of these values simply may not be 
great enough to identify statistical significance of the kind that is possible when comparing 
paradoxically different states and regions in the US. 
 The only reliable predictor in the analyses is diffusion, and the relationship between state 
adoption of FiT and diffusion is particularly strong in all models. These results suggest that the 
states of Europe are very responsive to the actions taken by their neighbors even when a 
domestic impetus for legislation is lacking. Again, this is a surprising finding for those who 
specialize in DOI research, and it offers an equally interesting contribution to common pool 
resource research.  The management of the common resource of environmental quality is not 
being done voluntarily in Europe by states choosing to bear a cost while others could potentially 
free-ride. Instead, a strong diffusion effect within the EU ensures that member states follow a 
policy prescription that gains momentum. States adopt a policy protecting common resources, 
because they are confident that other states will follow suit and because other states have already 
done so. This minimizes the risks associated with adopting policies that would otherwise be cost-
prohibitive or economically disadvantageous while simultaneously providing incentive for states 
to be creative policymakers. States that come up with a progressive idea can be confident that 
they will be a trendsetter for their successful policy design. This strong diffusion effect 
overcomes the traditionally held self-interest that precludes innovative management of common 
resources. Indeed, the cooperative nature of states in the EU relative to those in the US may 
explain the divergence in results when applying the DOI model to policy adoption. While 
European states have become increasingly integrated and apt to mirror the policy designs of their 
neighbors, the political environment in the US has become increasingly combative. A resurgence 
of states‘ rights in the US and a desire to increase state power while minimizing federal influence 
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would explain the emphasis on internal determinants found in the US while European states are 
simultaneously more influenced by regional forces. 
CONCLUSION 
 This paper tests the integrated DOI model and applies it to a new geographical region, the 
EU, in order to identify important predictors for why states choose to adopt a RE promoting 
policy. The results suggest that internal factors are not important in states‘ decisions to introduce 
a RE program. This is a surprising finding that runs contrary to a significant body of previous 
research in which internal determinants are found to be particularly salient. This may be a result 
of the limited time frame available for some of the data used, or it could be a consequence of a 
more closely clustered, homogeneous political entity relative to the US. Instead, this research 
shows that regional pressure from other states in the EU is the primary force behind states‘ 
choices to adopt and what motivates states in the EU to manage common pool resources in 
circumstances where they may not otherwise. In this respect, proximity and similarity between 
states fosters policy adoption as EU states are more cooperative and likely to mimic the actions 
of their neighbors. In the EU, states are more like one another, and they are therefore more likely 
to embrace the policies adopted by one another.  
 Some of the limitations of this study have been discussed above and include the time 
span, selected variables, and my inability to measure certain diffusion effects. I would prefer a 
data set longer than 20 years, and some variables used had particularly short durations available. 
Over time, the data made available on EUROSTAT should only increase, and a longer time 
frame should only help diffusion studies of this nature. Additionally, I wanted to incorporate 
hegemonic and hierarchical diffusion measures, but I was unable to successfully integrate those 
data sets into my regression analysis. A successful attempt in this regard would provide a good 
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supplement to my research by providing a more nuanced understanding of the diffusion effect 
taking place in FiT diffusion.  
 Future research should continue to test the integrated DOI model on the EU in order to 
determine if state motivation for policy adoption better mirrors results found in US applications 
or, as I found in my study, the results continue to diverge from one another. This research could 
continue to examine environmental policies and their spread or diverge into other areas such as 
tax policy, education policy, etc. Additionally, DOI research should continue to branch out and 
increased study of policy diffusion across geographic and political regions such as the African 
Union and ASEAN should be undertaken. Only through increased international analysis of DOI 
theory will we gain understanding of its strengths and weaknesses as a model, and it is important 
to continue to test this theory on a variety of political organizations. If researchers continue to 
find divergent results, it will be necessary to try and understand why. Is this theory not directly 
applicable to other regions outside the US? Or do different political entities simply not respond 
to the same impetus as the states in the US? If not, why not? 
 This research benefits a variety of actors. First, it contributes to DOI theory and common 
pool management research. Second, it benefits policymakers and government parties interested 
in understanding the drivers behind state action. Third, it aids lobbying interests, including 
environmental advocates and those affiliated with industry, that obviously have a vested interest 
in influencing policy adoption in their respective favor. DOI research impacts a diverse set of 
interests and continued study in this area would be of benefit not only to academia but a variety 
of actors in government.    
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Table 1. Independent Variable Descriptions 
 
Independent Variable     Description 
 
Problem severity 
Emissions of acidifying substances This indicator tracks trends in anthropogenic 
atmospheric emissions of acidifying substances 
(sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and ammonia) by 
source sector. Acidifying substance emissions are 
combined in terms of their acidifying effects, and 
expressed in acid equivalents. (EUROSTAT) 
 
Energy dependency 
Reliance on imports The indicator is calculated as net imports divided by 
the sum of gross inland energy consumption plus 
bunkers. (EUROSTAT) 
 
Ideology 
Social democratic party The European Election Database provides 
classifications of political parties according to the 
recognized Manifesto Project dataset. (European 
Election Database) 
 
Interest group pressure 
Green party European Green party election results are compiled 
by the party for each election cycle. 
 
Wealth 
GDP per capita GDP includes goods and services that have markets 
(or which could have markets) and products which 
are produced by general government and non-profit 
institutions. Real GDP per capita is calculated as the 
ratio of real GDP to the average population of a 
specific year. (EUROSTAT) 
 
Net National Income Gross national income (at market prices) represents 
total primary income receivable by resident 
institutional units in return for some engagement in 
productive activity: compensation of employees, 
taxes on production and imports less subsidies, 
property income (receivable less payable), gross 
operating surplus and gross mixed income. 
(EUROSTAT) 
 
Diffusion Year of feed-in tariff adoption for each member 
state.  
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Table 3. Determinants of FiT adoption (Full Model) 
(Logistic Regression) 
 
Variable      Coefficient  Std Error
 
Problem severity 
     Emissions of acidifying substances  0.000184  0.00049 
Energy dependency  
     Reliance on imports    -0.00375  0.00492 
Ideology 
     Social democratic party    0.000627  0.001258 
Interest group pressure 
     Green party     -0.0149  0.079243 
Wealth 
     GDP per capita     0.000131  0.000161 
Diffusion      49.01974  12.36484 *** 
N = 102 
Wald χ
2
 = 18.37 
Prob χ
2
 = .0054 
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at .1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of FiT adoption (Reduced Model 1) 
(Logistic Regression) 
 
Variable      Coefficient  Std Error
 
Problem severity 
     Emissions of acidifying substances  0.000027  0.0003493 
Ideology 
     Social democratic party    -0.0005333  0.000513 
Wealth 
     GDP per capita     -0.0001004  0.0000946 
Diffusion      46.22145  6.476092 *** 
N = 202 
Wald χ
2
 = 77.37 
Prob χ
2
 = 0.000 
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at .1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 5. Determinants of FiT adoption (Reduced Model 2) 
(Logistic Regression) 
 
Variable      Coefficient  Std Error
 
Problem severity 
     Emissions of acidifying substances  0.0001386  0.0002807 
Ideology 
     Social democratic party    -0.0008315  0.0006225 
Wealth 
     Net national income    0.0052923  0.0079564 
Diffusion      36.9935  4.292118 *** 
N = 260 
Wald χ
2
 = 86.21 
Prob χ
2
 = 0.000 
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at .1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 1. Date of FiT Adoption for EU Countries 
 
Country     Year of FiT Adoption 
 
Austria      2002 
Belgium      N/A  
Bulgaria      2007 
Cyprus       2003 
Czech Republic     2002 
Denmark      1993 
Estonia      2003 
Finland      N/A 
France       2001 
Germany      1990 
Greece       1994 
Hungary      2003 
Ireland       2005 
Italy       1992 
Latvia       2001 
Lithuania      2002 
Luxembourg      N/A 
Malta       N/A 
Netherlands      N/A 
Poland       2008 
Portugal      1999 
Romania      N/A 
Slovakia      2003 
Slovenia      1999 
Spain       1994 
Sweden      1998 
United Kingdom     2010 
 
Source: Institute for Building Efficiency, 2011 
